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Blood cultures from a heroin user who died in June 
2012, a few hours after hospital admission, due to 
acute septic disease, revealed the presence of Bacillus 
anthracis. This report describes the extended diag-
nosis by MALDI-TOF and real-time PCR and rapid con-
firmation of the anthrax infection through reference 
laboratories. Physicians and diagnostic laboratories 
were informed and alerted efficiently through the 
reporting channels of German public health institu-
tions, which is essential for the prevention of further 
cases.
In early June 2012, a case of anthrax infection was 
identified in an injecting drug user in Germany. Anthrax 
wasn’t suspected initially and the patient died on the 
day of hospital admission. Two days later anthrax was 
confirmed and the relevant authorities were informed. 
This report underlines the importance of considering 
anthrax as a possible diagnosis in injecting heroin 
users presenting with fever or sepsis at emergency 
rooms and of the rapid management of such cases.
Clinical case description
In early June 2012 an injecting drug user in their 50s 
presented at the emergency department of a hospi-
tal in the south of Germany, with a two-day history 
of worsening swelling and reddening at an injection 
site, nausea and dyspnoea. The patient had been on 
oral substitution therapy for two years. Moreover, a 
history of chronic hepatitis C infection with liver cir-
rhosis was reported. In the next hours after admission 
to hospital, the patient developed respiratory failure 
and was transferred to the intensive care unit (ICU) 
where they were ventilated mechanically. An elevated 
white blood cell count (15.9 cells/nL), anaemia (hae-
moglobin 10.4 g/dL), thrombocytopenia (38 cells/nL), 
elevated procalcitonin (1.05 ng/mL) and hypokalaemia 
(2.5 mmol/L) were observed. Elevated liver enzymes, 
lowered coagulation parameters and extremely high 
levels of D-dimers (>36,364 ng/mL) were pointing to 
multi-organ failure. Blood and urine cultures were sent 
to the Institute of Medical Microbiology and Hygiene, 
University of Regensburg. The patient’s condition 
worsened and they died on the day of admission due 
to a septic shock with multi-organ failure and massive 
disseminated bleeding. At the time, there was no clini-
cal suspicion of anthrax.
Laboratory analysis
Blood cultures (Becton Dickinson, Heidelberg, 
Germany) turned positive after 53 minutes of incuba-
tion. Gram-stained microscopy showed non-branching 
Gram-positive bacilli growing in chains. Subcultures 
presented typical growth of aerobic spore-forming 
bacilli without haemolysis. Matrix-assisted laser des-
orption/ionisation time-of-flight mass spectrometry 
(MALDI-TOF MS) identification revealed Bacillus cereus 
(Bruker Daltonics, Bremen, Germany). The patient’s 
history led to reanalysis with the Bruker ’SR Database’ 
that contains so-called security-relevant organisms, 
which correctly identified B. anthracis. 
An initial set of molecular diagnostic tests was per-
formed for confirmation at the Institute of Medical 
Microbiology and Hygiene, University of Regensburg. 
Briefly, a loopful of cells was suspended in 500 µL of 
detergent buffer. The buffer consisted of TE (pH 7.5) 
containing 0.5% Triton X-100 and 0.25% Tween 20. 
The suspension was heated at 95°C for 30 minutes 
with occasional shaking, sonicated for 1 minute, and 
heated again at 95°C for 30 minutes. After 10 min-
utes centrifugation at 11,000 × g, the supernatant was 
passed through a 0.2 µm sterile filtration membrane. 
Extracting genomic DNA from a boiled bacterial culture 
proved to be reproducible, easy-to-perform and rapid 
before [1]. The DNA was directly used as template for a 
series of real-time PCR assays performed with the Light 
Cycler PCR system (Roche Diagnostics, Mannheim, 
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LightMix Bacillus anthracis PCR Kit (testing 5 µl aliquots of the original and 1:10 diluted template DNA preparations, 
respectively).
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Germany). The real-time assays included an in-house 
protocol for pan-bacterial 16S rDNA amplification and 
the LightMix kit B. anthracis (Cat. No: 40-0252-16, TIB 
Molbiol, Berlin, Germany). The kit is designed to detect 
the pagA gene as marker for the plasmid pXO1 and a B. 
anthracis-specific segment of the bacterial rpoB gene 
for species identification, using hybridisation probes. 
Early crossing points (around cycle 18) and the specific 
melting points of the respective target genes pagA and 
rpoB were observed in the melting curve analysis, indi-
cating the presence of B. anthracis carrying at least the 
virulence plasmid pXO1 (Figure).
To substantiate the initial test results, an aliquot of the 
DNA preparation was sent to the Bundeswehr Institute 
of Microbiology in Munich. The initial PCR results were 
confirmed and extended using PCR assays for the capC 
gene (marker for the second virulence plasmid pXO2) 
and an additional chromosomal marker highly specific 
for B. anthracis (dhp61) [2]. First results of molecular 
genotyping of the strain showed close relationship to 
strains from a large anthrax outbreak among IDUs in 
Scotland [3].
Control measures
The District Health Office was informed about the sus-
pected case of human B. anthracis infection immedi-
ately after obtaining the PCR results. Their experts 
got involved in the management of the case in close 
contact with the diagnostic institutions, the police 
authorities and the Task Force Infectiology of the 
Bavarian Health and Food Safety Authority (LGL). 
Health officials considered contaminated heroin or cut-
ting agents mixed with the heroin as possible source 
of the infection. Further investigations by the German 
police authorities were initiated immediately.
The competent public health authorities at national 
level were informed immediately about the confirma-
tion of B. anthracis. The information on the occurrence 
of the case was distributed to the public health author-
ities in all 16 German federal states, at international 
level through the Early Warning and Response System 
(EWRS) of the European Commission and via ProMED-
mail [4]and according to the International Health 
Regulations (IHR). In Bavaria, the medical associations 
were informed. Substance abuse counselling agen-
cies were contacted nationally and at European level 
through the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) in order to spread the infor-
mation among drug users. Additional information and 
materials were published by the public health insti-
tutes on their websites.
Identification of the second case
Two weeks after the first case was admitted to hospi-
tal, a second case of anthrax was identified in an IDU 
from the same region as the first case. The patient is 
stable under antibiotic therapy after surgical debride-
ment [5]. The raised level of awareness created with 
the first case lead to a much faster workflow in the 
laboratory analysis in the second case. B. anthracis 
was confirmed three hours after blood cultures turned 
positive.
Discussion
Injectional anthrax has first been reported 1988 as 
fourth route of infection besides cutaneous, gas-
trointestinal and inhalational anthrax infections [6]. 
The first anthrax case related to injecting drug use 
was described 2000 from Norway [7]. There were no 
subsequent reports of injectional anthrax until 10 
December 2009 when anthrax was identified in blood 
cultures from two injecting drug users from Glasgow, 
Scotland [8]. In the following months an increasing 
number of cases were identified [9]. By the end of the 
outbreak in December 2010, there were 47 confirmed 
cases of injectional anthrax (including 13 deaths), 35 
probable cases (including one death) and 37 possible 
cases in Scotland and five cases including four deaths 
in England [3]. There were two confirmed cases in 
Germany related to this outbreak, including one fatal 
case [10]. The favoured outbreak hypothesis assumed 
that heroin had been in contact with goat skin con-
taminated with anthrax spores during transportation 
to Scotland [3]. Risk factors for infection were longer 
injection history, receiving opioid substitution therapy, 
and alcohol consumption [11]. All cases of injectional 
anthrax reported so far including the case presented 
here were not associated with the typical black eschar-
seen in patients with cutaneous anthrax [12].
Box 1
Timeline of events, fatal case of anthrax infection, 
Germany, June 2012 
Day 1 • Patient admitted to the hospital
• Blood cultures sent to the laboratory
• Patient dies due to septic shock
• Blood cultures positive with Gram-positive bacilli    
   (late afternoon) 
Day 2 • Growth of Bacillus spp. on subcultures
• MALDI-TOF: Bacillus cereus
• Discussions on anthrax suspicion
• Different PCRs and 16S sequencing  
   over night 
Day 3 • B. anthracis confirmed by PCR
• Information of local health authorities
• Involvement of regional and national health and  
   police authorities 
• DNA sent to Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology
Day 4 • B. anthracis confirmed using  
   further PCRs
• Robert Koch Institute promotes further      
   information at national and international level 
MALDI-TOF MS: matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionisation  
time-of-flight mass spectrometry.
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Because B. anthracis is seen very rarely in Germany 
and other developed countries, laboratory staff and 
clinicians should raise their attention when Gram-
positive bacilli growing in chains are detected in clini-
cal specimens (Box 2). 
 
B. anthracis cannot be reliably distinguished from B. 
cereus by growth characteristics, bacterial cell mor-
phology or biochemical methods. The applicability of 
MALDI-TOF-MS for the identification of B. anthracis 
was demonstrated elsewhere [13]. Because of safety 
regulations, B. anthracis and other potential bioter-
roristic agents are not included in the manufacturer’s 
(Bruker Daltonics) database. As in our case, the isolate 
is classified as B. cereus with the standard databases. 
Using a special database, containing the missing spec-
tra, B. anthracis is identified correctly. The manufac-
turer discourages the standard use of the B. anthracis 
spectra due to misidentification of members of the B. 
cereus group. Consequently, the result ’B. cereus’ in 
combination with a patient’s history of injecting drug 
use should lead to further diagnostic steps. To dif-
ferentiate between B. anthracis and non-anthracis 
Bacillus species harbouring anthrax-specific virulence 
plasmids, PCR targeting a chromosomal marker should 
be performed in addition to PCR assays covering the 
virulence plasmids pXO1 and pXO2. Non-pathogenic 
B. anthracis strains not containing plasmids can be 
identified using this combination as well [2, 14]. 
Conclusions
Health professionals and diagnostic laboratories 
should consider anthrax as a possible diagnosis in 
injecting heroin users presenting with fever or sepsis 
at the emergency room. The observed re-emergence of 
drug-related anthrax in Germany supports the hypoth-
esis that heroin may provide a continuing entry route of 
B. anthracis into western Europe.
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Box 2
Recommendations and lessons learnt from the fatal case 
of anthrax infection, Germany, June 2012
• When growth of Bacillus cereus sensu lato is identified by 
the MALDI species typing database, a sound anamnesis of 
the underlying clinical case should be performed. 
• Suspicious cultures should be transferred to a biosafety 
level 3 environment and, whenever possible, a spectrum of 
validated molecular tests should be kept in stock for level 3 
pathogens (especially anthrax).
• An agreed case definition and protocol for alerting 
the authorities should be available and known to all 
microbiologists and clinicians.
• Appropriate reporting channels should be maintained and 
exercised by the public health authorities to prevent that 
similar (or parallel) cases remain undetected. 
• Confirmatory PCR testing in a specialised laboratory should 
be immediately requested. Diagnostic laboratories should 
know such specialised laboratories in their vicinity for 
support and check the logistics of sample transport in a 
situation of emergency (ideally before they encounter their 
first uncommon strain).
• Clinicians and microbiologists should be trained on a 
regular basis in the identification of anthrax and other rare 
infectious diseases that are highly pathogenic.
MALDI: Matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionisation.
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